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I. Introduction
An "incentive" or "performance" fee is compensation to a port-
folio manager that varies according to investment results rather than solely
the amount of assets under management. The determination of a fair basis
for evaluating investment results is of concern to both economists and leg-
islators. The purpose of this essay is to examine the impact on advisory
compensation of the use of two types of performance fee arrangements. The
basic difference in the plans is the method of measuring investment perform-
ance. The first (Plan 1) is of the type used in current practice, where
performance is measured by comparing fund return directly with that of a
market index, such as the Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Composite Index. The
second (Plan 2) employs the '"market line" type of risk adjustment usually
associated with the Sharpe [ ] - Lintner [ ] Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), where performance is measured by comparing fund return with that of
a risk ("beta") adjusted market portfolio.
The use of performance fees to reward investment company advisers
is now commonplace. A significant portfion of all investment companies, par-
ticularly those with growth oriented investment objectives, have performance
fee advisory contracts. In mid-1966 there were only four mutual funds with
performance fees, but one year later there were 16. By June 1970 the number




funds whose registration statements were pending at the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Reflecting this dramatic trend, approximately 40 percent of the
registered investment companies which commenced operation in 1968 and 1969
proposed to use performance fee arrangements.-/ However, changes in the Invest-
ment Advisers Act, which regulates the type of performance fees that can be
used, brought a halt to the trend. As of January 1972, 103 of 999 active
registered investment companies had performance fee plans.3/
The regulation of performance fees began in 1940 with the passage
of the Investment Advisers Act. With the Act Congress prohibited the use of
any type of performance fee by Registered Investment Advisers except for the
fees charged to registered investment companies by their advisers. During the
following 30 years the types of performance fees used by fund advisers
typically fell into two categories; fees based on performance relative to a
market index and fees based solely on the performance of the fund itself
without reference to the performance of a market index (e.g., twenty percent
of the capital gains). However, the payments were typically one way. Bonuses
were paid when a fund outperformed on index, but no penalties (or disproportion-
ately small penalties) were imposed when the index outperformed the fund. In
the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 Congress required that any per-
formance fee charged to registered investment companies be symmetric, that is
penalties for substandard investment performance must be symmetrical with
rewards for superior performance. Fees not related to some appropriate index
of securities prices (e.g. percentage of capital gain type fees) were prohibited.
The 1970 Act gave the Securities and Exchange Commission the authority to
determine what constituted an appropriate index of securities prices. The
______I___1__C11_l_____l.
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1970 Act also extended the use of performance fees to most other types of in-
vestment advisory accounts where the assets under management exceed $1
million.
However, a further problem exists with non-risk adjusted type
performance fee plans which is well known to economists. The problem was also
recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and stated succinctly
in the letter of transmittal to the Institutional Investor Study / . . .
When an adviser is compensated on the basis of total return or
return relative to an index having a lower volatility than the port-
folio itself, an incentive is created for the manager to assume
greater risk. Thus, when inventive fees are present, . .. (it)
appears desirable to eliminate as fully as possible the realization
of compensation by investment managers based in part on risk borne
by portfolio beneficiaries.
A possible solution to the problem was contained in the study . .
To accomplish this end the Commission intends to give serious
and prompt consideration to requiring that incentive fees be based
only on volatility adjusted investment returns. Incentive compen-
sation would thus be permitted only on that portion of total invest-
ment return that is in excess of what general market movements affecting
securities displaying equivalent volatility would produce on an
unmanaged basis. Technical methods for basing incentive fees on
such risk or volatility adjusted returns were adopted for analytic
purposes by the Study. Although the techniques employed are of rela-
tively recent origin, it appears that measures of risk adjusted in-
vestment "performance" such as employed in the Study are feasible.
Their use, as well as other methods for accomplishing this end that
amy be developed, can provide appropriate and unbiased methods of
calculating managerial compensation that would discourage the assump-
tion of excessive risk in managed portfolios, permit superior advisers
to obtain additional compensation and permit the profitable operation
of smaller economic units not having access to large and efficient
sales organizations.
The Commission, via the 1970 Act essentially has the authority to require risk
5/
adjusted measures for incentive fee plans- . .
The Commission now has authority under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
as amended by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 to determine
an appropriate index or other measure of investment performance for incentive
compensation purposes that reflects the degree of volatility displayed by
managed portfolios.
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To date the SEC has taken no further steps to this end. In a recent
release the Commission laid down very general guidelines for the choice of an
appropriate index.6 /
In determining whether an index is appropriate for a particular invest-
ment company, directors should consider factors such as the volatility,
diversification of holdings, types of securities owned and objectives
of the investment company. For example, for investment companies that
invest in a broad range of common stocks, a broadly based market value
weighted index of common stocks ordinarily would be an appropriate index,
but an index based upon a relatively few large "blue chip" stocks would
not. For investment companies that invest exclusively in a particular
type of security or industry, either a specialized index that adequately
represents the performance of that type of security or a broadly based
market value weighted index ordinarily would be considered appropriate.
Of course, if an investment company invests in a particular type of
security an index which measures the performance of another particular
type of security would not be appropriate.
On the question of risk adjustment, the following was added in a
footnote 7 /
Technical methods for specifying incentive fees based upon risk or
volatility adjusted returns are now being explored by the staff and
a number of industry and academic groups as well as commercial enter-
prises. However, the Commission has not, at this time, arrived
at any conclusions with respect to these methods.
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of our research
on the impact of "market line" type risk adjustment on the compensation received
by investment advisers. While it is understood that the CAPM is not the final
answer in the search for performance measurement benchmarks, it indeed provides
a convenient and familiar alternative to the clearly non-optimal solution of
no risk adjustment. Hence our focus will be on the improvements resulting




(1) What impact to current practice and market line based fee
plans have on the amount and volatility of advisory compensation? What
differences result in shifting from Plan 1 to Plan 2? How are the changes
related to the amount of shareholder borne risk, that is, to the fund beta
values?
(2) How are the results for Plans 1 and 2 affected by changes in
the way in which investment performance is measured, changes such as the
use of a different market index or performance measurement horizon?
We have examined these questions both analytically and with the
aid of simulation. Based on the CAPM, we have developed predictions of the
effects of using the two fee plans and their modifications. Simulation has
been used to determine the annual compensation results for each plan for an
twelve year test period (1960-1971) for a group of 49 mutual funds.
It should be carefully noted that our methodology does not involve
a specific examination of the behavior and advisory fee records of samples
of mutual funds which had employed the two types of fee plans. While this
would have been an obviously useful strategy, it is also an impossible one;
an insufficient number of funds (and no low risk funds) have long enough plan
1 histories and none have plan 2 experience. Accordingly, our basic methodology
will consist of examining the effect the alternative fee plans would have had
on the amount and variability of advisory compensation of a sample non-incentive
fee funds, using the actual historical performance of these funds as the
basis for the incentive fee calculations. Using this approach we can examine
the impact of the incentive fee plans while holding the investment risk of the
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funds at the non-incentive fee levels; that is, given beta, how would the
adoption of Plan 1 or 2 affect the level and volatility of advisory compensa-
tion. Based on these conditional results, we can make predictions as to the
changes in advisory behavior that might result from the adoption of a per-
formance fee, changes that would either increase the expected level or de-
crease the volatility of advisory compensation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
contains the answer to question 1, Section III the answer to question 2 and
Section IV presents our conclusions and recommendations.
II. Comparison of Plans 1 and 2
This section is organized as follows: Part A develops the under-
lying theory; B describes the fee plans used in the simulations; C describes
the measures used in evaluating compensation results; D describes the 49
fund simulation sample; E presents the empirical results and, F summarizes
our findings.
A. Theory
The Capital Asset Pricing Model provides the foundation for our
theoretical analysis of performance fees. We use the model to predict the na-
ture of the relationship between the amount and volatility of performance fee
compensation and fund beta values. While it is obviously not possible to
predict exactly the simulation results, the CAPM will provide insights in
order to understand the results obtained. Differences will result because




relationships, and because the actual fee plans simulated tend to be somewhat
8I
more complicated than that discussed in this part- / Here we will focus on
the main features of the plans leaving refinements to the simulation calcula-
tions.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model relates the expected return on a
portfolio to its systematic risk as measured by beta (p). That is,
E(R) = + p (E(R) -R) (1)
where E(Rp), E(RM) and R are the expected returns on the portfolio, market
index and riskless bond respectively. Thus, the realized return during the
period can be expressed as
_p F + N + p( ) p (2)
where £p is the residual (unsystematic) element of portfolio return which,
under the CAPM hypothesis has a zero expected return. Realized values of £
p
different from zero are evidence of superior ( > 0) or inferior (p < 0)
p p
investment performance.
Assuming the amount of the performance fee paid to the adviser is
directly proportional to the return differential between the fund and the
standard, Rs, then the fee paid, FEEp, is given by
FE = 6(- s) (3)p p s





Consider first the non-risk adjusted Plan 1. The comparison standard
is simply the market return, I. Substituting for Rp (from equation 2) and
R into equation (3), we obtain
FEE = 6{(S - 1)( - RF) + E (4)
Thus, the performance fee depends on the fund beta and the market risk premium
M - , as well as the CAPM performance measure p. The expected fee is
given by
E(FEEp) = 6( - 1) E(RM-RF) (5)
Assuming the expected market risk premium is positive, the expected fee is
an increasing function of 8p. For "neutral" performance relative to the CAPM
standard (i.e. £ = 0), the expected fee is positive for funds with betas
p
greater than 1.0, and negative for funds with betas less than 1.0. Thus,
Plan 1 has a built in bias in favor of higher risk funds. The effect is
illustrated in figure 2.1.
The variance of the Plan 1 incentive fee is given by
a(Feep) = 62( - 1.0)2 2( - Rf)+ 2 (Ep) (6)
where a (R - Rf) and a (Ep) are the variances of the market risk premium
m p
and residual return component respectively.
The equation shows Plan 1 fee variation to have two components --
a market term resulting from bias in the performance measure and a residual
term resulting from incomplete portfolio diversification. The market com-
ponent increases for beta differentials either side of Bp = 1.0. The CAPM
however gives no indication of how the residual component will vary with 8p,
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if at all. If ( ) was independent of fp, then a (FPEp) would be a "V"
shaped function of with minimum value of = 1.0. However, this is not
the case. During the 12 year test period there was a strong positive re-
lationship between a 2(p) and p.9 / Using estimates of 2 (Ep) for the 49-fund
sample, we have estimated values for the market and residual components of
fee variation. The results are listed in table 2. 1 and illustrated in figure
10/
2.2--- Since we are primarily concerned with the shape of the relationship,
temporarily
the scaling factor 6 has been/ignored. The (FEE p) vs. p relationship is
reasonable flat for beta values less than 1.0, rising sharply for betas greater
than 1.0. For the higher beta funds, the market component tends to be in-
significant relative to the residual variation term. For low beta funds the
market component, (resulting from the performance measurement bias) tends to
dominate.
Consider now the second plan. The return standard (R s) is equal
the mixture of market index and risk free rate with the same beta as the
fund, thus R = + p( - RF). Substituting for R and Rs in equation (3),
P
the expression for FEE is given by
FEE . (7)
P P
Therefore, the expected fee is given by
E(FEEp) O (8)
Thus, under CAPM assumptions, the expected performance fee for all beta
values is zero. Thus, non-zero values of p will be rewarded or penalized
i
in a consistent manner for the complete range of fund betas.
_ _·__.11_11--
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Fee volatility for Plan 2 is given by
o 2 (FEEp ) = 22 (E p ) (9)
The removal of the performance measurement bias has eliminated the market
component of fee variation, leaving the residual term. Thus, fee volatility
for low beta funds will be substantially reduced, and largely unaffected
for the higher beta funds. The relationship between (FEE ) and Bp is illus-
trated in figure 2.2 (see table 2.1 for numerical values for plan 2 The curve
rises over the complete beta range, rising most sharply for the high beta
values.
In summary, the CAPM predicts that Plan 1 performance fees will be
biased in favor of higher risk funds. The model also predicts that the mar-
ket line performance standard used in Plan 2 will eliminate the bias, and
reduce fee variability over time, particularly for the lowest beta funds.
B. Fee Plans Simulated
The investment advisory contract between a mutual fund and its
investment adviser defines the amount of compensation to be paid in re-
turn for investment advisory and administrative services. Performance
fee contracts pay a management fee which is divided into two parts: (1)
a basic fee based on net asset value, plus or minus (2) a fee based upon
a comparison of the performance of the fund with that of an index.
The same basic fee arrangement was used for both of the simulated
fee plans. The parameters were chosen to reflect values used in practice.ll/
__._ _1_1__1_·_____
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It is based on the following annual rates.
0.60% on the first $100 million of net assets
0.55% on the next $150 million
0.50% on the next $250 "
0.45% on the next $500 "
0.40% on net assets over $1,000 million.
In practice the basic fee is typically payable monthly and is computed on
the net asset value of the Fund as of the close of business each day, at a
rate of (1/365) of the annual figure. However, our simulations are based
on monthly data, thus the base fee will be computed at the end of each month,
at (1/12) the annual rate applied to the average net assets of the month (an
average of beginning and ending net asset values).
The incentive fee component of the simulated plans is based on per-
12/
formance measured over a rolling 12 month measurement period-2/For Plan 1,
performance is measured by computing the difference in cummulative 12 month
return between the fund and the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock
13/price index- /The returns on both fund and index are adjusted for all dis-
tributions.
For Plan 2, the performance standard is a risk adjusted index,
based on the combination of the Standard and Poor's 500 index and 30 day
treasury bills which produce the same beta over the 12 month period. Where
levering was required to achieve a portfolio beta in excess of 1.0, borrow-
ing was assumed to occur at the prime bank rate, adjusted to reflect the
credit rating of the fund.1 4 / Performance is measured by computing the diffe-
rence in cummulative return between the fund and this "market line" standard
of equivalent beta.
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Given the return differential over the past 12 months, the fund
adviser receives additional compensation, or pays a penalty of an annualized
rate of 0.022 percent of net present value for each percentage point of excess
15/
returnrL-up to a maximum of 0.40 percent for a return differential of 18 percent.
For return differentials in excees of 18 percent, the incentive fee increment
16/
remains at 0.40 percent of assets-- The fee is based on the average net asset
17/
value during the 12 month horizon-- The fee is computed and paid monthly at
one twelfth of the annualized rate.,
In practice the return differentials are computed by comparing
fund return (net of management expenses) to the return on the index. How-
ever, the index does not represent a viable investment alternative to the
fund. The fund has expenses which are not directly related to the quality
of the investment advice provided by the adviser. These include administra-
tive expenses, liquidity costs, and the transactions costs associated with
the investment of net cash flow to the fund. From a standpoint of fairness,
the return on the standard should be adjusted to reflect these costs. The
standard should not be adjusted, however, for an investment advisory fee,
as the comparison portfolio is assumed to remain unchanged over time. Thus,
in our simulations we have attempted to assign "reasonable" expenses to the
comparison standard. While the cost parameters have been chosen to reflect
industry practice, we will perform sensitivity analysis in Part III to ex-
amine the impact of changes.
Administrative expense ratios were assigned to reflect the costs
of running a viable mutual fund. Annual expense ratios of 0.20, 0.25 and
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0.30 percent were assigned to the comparison standards of large, medium and
18/
small funds. - These values were estimated from an examination of admini-
strative expense ratios charged by mutual funds during 1969.
Furthermore, it was assumed that at least 1.5 percent of the
assets of the Plan 1 and 2 comparison standards would remain invested in
liquid assets, namely 30 day treasury bills. This was done to retain com-
parability with real mutual funds which are forced to maintain liquidity re-
serves. The requirement has no impact for Plan 2 comparison standards with
betas of 0.985 or less, since they already contain sufficient liquid assets.
For Plan 2 standards with betas greater than this value, additional borrowing
is assumed to provide the required liquid assets.
Additionally, net cash flows were assigned a brokerage cost of 0.75
percent of the amount invested. The net cash flows used were the industry
average figures published by the Investment Company Institute. Thus, the
performance standard for each fund was assumed to have a sales pattern equal
to the industry (on a proportion of assets basis).
Algebraically, the expense ratio for year t (EXt) can be stated as
EX = EXPAt + CFLW * COM + CBAL * (t - RLt) (10)t t t
where EXPAt is the administrative expense ratio for year t, CFLWt is the net
cash flow into the portfolio during the previous 12 months (as a percentage
of net assets), COM is the brokerage rate, CBAL is the percentage of net
assets to be held in liquid assets, and (Rt - Rt) is the difference between
the fund's borrowing and lending rates. Under Plan 2, for funds with beta
values less than 0.985, the last term in equation 10 is not required. EXt
is subtracted from RSt prior to the computation of the return differential.
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C. Measurement of Results
A computer simulation program was constructed to perform the month-
by-month fee calculations for Plans 1 and 2 for each of the funds in the sample.
Based on the actual return record for each fund, the program computes the
in turn each of
amount of compensation that would have been received if the fund had used/the
two plans. Details of the simulation calculations, and a sample set of results
are described in appendix A. The simulations cover the period from 1961
through 1971, 1960 data having been used to initialize the simulation calcula-
tions.
The fund-by-fund simulation results are in dollar terms, that
is the amounts of basic and performance fees computed during each month of
the eleven-year period. Since the basic fee is the same under both plans,
our focus is on the amount of incentive fee compensation that would have
been paid. However, since the funds differ substantially in size (from
a few million dollar of net assets to a few billion), comparisons based on
total performance fee dollars would not be meaningful. The solution we
have adopted is to focus on the ratio of performance fee dollars to
dollars of basic fee. This ratio should not be substantially affected
by fund size, and thus allows meaningful interfund comparisons. The
ratio has a useful interpretation, since it represents the increase or
decrease in basic fee resulting from the adoption of the performance
fee. The fee ratios will be expressed in percentage terms. Thus,
a fee ratio of 5 percent indicates the performance fee increased the
advisers compensation by 5 percent over the basic fee alone.
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We have used two types of fee ratios to measure the incentive
compensation for each fund: an annual fee ratio (designated FEET) and an
11 year ratio (designated FEE). FEET equals the ratio of the performance


















= the average net asset value during the 12 months ending at month t
= the average net assets during month t
= the 12 month cummulative return on the portfolio to month t
= the 12 month market return
= the monthly performance fee rate (e.g. 0.022%/12)
= the monthly base fee rate (62 = 0.55%/12)
= (61/62) (6 = 4.0)
=(At 2) is the average net assets during the 12 months ending
in month t to the average net assets during the calendar year
(note that X12 = 1).
The 11 year fee ratio, FEE, equals the ratio of the total performance fee
compensation for the fund during the 11 year test period to the total basic
fee for the fund.
Finally, we require a measure of the volatility of the advisory com-
pensation received by the adviser. The measure we have adopted is the standard
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deviation of the year-by-year fee ratios, designated SDF .
SDF 1/10 Z (FEE - FEE ) 1/2 (12)
t=l
where FEEt is the mean value of the annual fee ratios for the fund. The standard
deviation has a particularly useful interpretation. It measures the incre-
mental volatility in total advisory compensation {(Performance + Basic Fees)/
(Basic Fee)} resulting from adoption of the performance fee plan. In the absence
of the incentive fee, SDF would equal zero. With the adoption of the fee plan,
the fee ratios can be taken on non-zero values, resulting in a potential desta-
bilizing influence on total advisory compensation.
After obtaining the fee ratios and fee ratios standard devia-
tions, we will be particularly concerned with the relationship between
these items and fund betas. The relationship is examined using re-
gression analysis. For the annual fee ratios the regression equation is given
by
FEEjt = + Yljt j=l, . ., 49 (13)
where jt is the average of the rolling 12 month beta value for fund j
during year t and, for the total period fee ratios,
FEEj - YO + YJ J=1 , , 49 (14)
where Ij is the average of the rolling 12 month beta value for fund j during
the 11 year simulation period.
D. Fund Sample
The incentive fee simulations are based on a sample of 49 mutual
funds which had complete monthly returns data over the period from January
11111_-- -- -
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1960 through December 1971.
The sample was not chosen randomly, but chosen selectively to reflect
a wide range of investment objectives and policies. The sample contains
funds with beta values during the 12 year period ranging from 0.10 to 1.50,
with an average value of 0.92. The distribution of investment objectives for
the sample (using the 1969 Weisenberger [ ] objective classifications) show
that eight of the funds had maximum capital gain objectives, 19 had growth,
14 had growth and income and 8 had income objectives. The net assets of the
funds ranged from a few million dollars to a few billion dollars. As dis-
cussed in Part I, only two of the funds actually used a performance fee for
at least part of the 12 year test period, namely the Oppenheimer fund and the
Windsor Fund.
While the majority of the sample is composed of common stock or
balanced funds, three bond funds were also included. (Keystone B, B2, and
B4). This was done to broaden the range of beta values contained in the
sample. The hope was that fee characteristics resulting from differences in
fund risk would appear more distinctly in comparative analyses among funds.
Their inclusion in th( sample can be questioned however, since the performance
standard does not include long term bonds. Recognizing this problem, the
results for the 46 fund subsample (which excludes the bond funds) will be pre-
sented as well (in footnotes) whenever significant differences occur.
E. Simulation Results
The empirical results are organized as follows: (1) individual fund
results for Plans (1) and (2) (See tables 2.2, 2.3); (2) fee ratio summary
results for both plans and difference between plans (figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5
and tables2.4, 2.6 & 2.7);(3) fee ratio standard deviation summary results for
_1_1 _1_1_____ ___
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both plans (figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 and tables 2.5 and 2.6).
(1) Individual fund results
The total simulated advisory compensation for the 49 funds during
the eleven year test period was 18.89 million dollars under fee Plan 1, and
19.52 million for Plan 2. Of these amounts 18.84 million resulted from the
basic fee component. Thus, on average, incentive compensation was a small
part of the total, amounting to 0.06 and 0.69 million dollars for fee Plans
1 and 2 respectively. Total Plan 1 compensation (see table 2.2) ranged from
a high of 96.6 million for the largest fund (Massachusetts Investors Trust)
to a low of 0.57 million for the smallest fund (Keystone B.2). While the
impact of Plan 1 for the fund group as a whole was small, this is not the
case for individual funds. The incentive fee compensation ranged from a
maximum of 4.4 million (Chemical Fund) to a penalty of 15.5 million (Wellington
Fund). Total Plan 2 compensation (see table 2.3) ranged from 98.8 million
for the largest to 0.67 million for the smallest fund. Incentive compensation
ranged from 5.0 million (Affiliated Fund) to a penalty of 7.0 million
(Wellington Fund).
(2) Fee ratio summary results
Under Plan 1, the average fund had a performance fee ratio of -0.62
percent (see table 2.4). Thus, for the average fund the use of fee Plan 1
would have slightly reduced the amount of compensation received relative to
the base fee. The 28 funds with betas less than 1.0 (the low beta sub-sample)
had an average total fee ratio of -2.82 percent. The 21 funds with betas
greater than 1.0 (the high beta sub-sample) had a value of 2.31 percent. Of
the , low beta funds, only eight had positive fee ratios compared to 17 of
the high beta funds. Thus, as predicted, fee Plan appears to discriminate
_111_____11___·__I_. _..- -_.______^_1__IX_-_111_·1.11···_ ._. I_ .. .. _...
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against the lower beta funds.
The bias is confirmed by the regression of fee ratios on fund betas.
For the overall sample, the slope of the regression line is equal to 11.19,
with a t statistic of 2.95, indicating a significant positive relationship.
The relationship is even stronger for the low beta sub-sample (Y1 = 23.76
percent, t1 = 4.14), but of the wrong sign for the high beta sub-sample
(Y1 = -21.47 percent tl = -2.06). Examination of the fee ratio scattergram
for Plan 1 partially explains this result (see figure 2.3). There are two
funds with substantial beta values and low fee ratios. These observations
tend to exaggerate the magnitude of the negative correlation. The exclusion
of these observations results in a regression coefficient which is much closer
19/
to zero.- The lack of a significant positive relationship between fee
ratios and betas for the high risk sub-sample is due at least in part to the
high residual variation of these funds, which tends to obscure the underlying
relationship.
The results for Plan 1 lose a good deal of their statistical signi-
ficance when the three bond funds are removed. The relationship between the
total fee ratio and beta for the 46 funds is not significant at the 5 percent
20/
level. The significance of the relationship for the 25 low beta funds re-
21/
mains high though it too declines-. These results are in part to be expected,
since removal of the bond funds substantially reduces the range of beta values
in the sample. Thus, the regression lines are more susceptible to residual
22/
variation in the fund returns -
The averages for Plan 2 present a more consistent pattern across
the range of beta values. The total fee ratio for the total sample was 3.32
percent compared with 3.51 percent and 3.07 percent for the low and high beta
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sub-samples respectively. 21 of the 28 low beta funds (75 percent) had
positive fee ratios compared with 16 of the 21 (76 percent) of the high beta
funds. Thus, Plan 2 appears to be free of the bias inherent in Plan 1. The
lack of a significant correlation with beta is shown by the regression of fee
ratios versus beta; the regression line slope (y1) for the total sample equals
-0.16 percent, with a t value of -0.04. For the low beta sub-sample a
positive relationship remains, but it is not significant at the 5 percent level.
For the high beta sub-sample the relationship is negative, but insignificant
at the 5 percent level. When the two outliers discussed above are removed,
this negative slope is substantially reduced.2 3/ The three bond funds had
fee ratios consistent with the stock funds (-5.3, 2.6 and 7.1 for Keystone
B1, B2 and B4 respectively) and their exclusion from the sample has no sig-
nificant effect on the Plan 2 results.2 4/
An unpredicted result is the overall average fee ratio of 3.3 per-
cent for Plan 2, given the CAPM prediction of zero. The result is due to
an average superior risk adjusted performance of the funds during the test
period. The average excess return earned by the funds (before adjusting the
standard for expenses) was 1.2 percent per year. The excess return resulted,
on average, in positive incentive compensation being earned by the advisers.
The fact that under Plan 1 the average fee ratio was negative (-0.62 percent)
despite the superior risk adjusted performance reflects the fact that well over
half the funds (57 percent) have betas less than 1; and Plan 1 tends to
discriminate against low beta funds.
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Our hypothesis that in shifting from Plan 1 to Plan 2 should increase
partially
the fee ratios for low beta funds and decrease them for high beta funds is/con-
firmed in figure 2.5. The figure shows the scattergram of differences in fee
ratios between fee Plans 1 and 2 versus beta. The slope of the relationship
is -11.34 percent, with a t statistic of -10.35.
The fee ratios for the low beta sample increased on average by
6.32 percentage points. The average difference (designated residual in table
2.6) is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confi-
dence (t statistic for mean - 7.87). 27 of the 28 funds had increased fee
ratios under Plan 2. The differences range from a reduction of -0.39 to a
gain of 17.92 percentage points. Thus Plan 2 is almost unanimously preferable
to Plan 1 for the low beta funds.
Curiously enough, the average fee ratio for the high beta funds
is slightly higher under Plan 2 as well. The average increased by 0.75 per-
cent, with individual values ranging from a 3.35 percent reduction to a 4.00
percent increase. The mean difference however is not significantly different
from zero at the 5 percent level (t ratio for mean - 1.77). Fourteen of the high
beta funds showed increases, 7 decreases. Thus, the shift to Plan 2 had
a much less well defined effect for thi high beta funds. We will return to
this result below when the year by year results are discussed.
The changes in the annual fee ratios resulting from a shift from
Plan 1 to 2 present a picture consistent with the theory. For the low beta
funds the fee ratios were predicted to increase in years with positive market
returns, and decrease in years with negative returns. The predictions are
__II__-_ -I ------ _-
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reversed for the high beta subsample. The year by year results are presented
in table 2.7. The changes in fee ratios were in the direction predicted for
the low beta funds in 10 of 11 years, the exception (1969) being a year when
the average of the 12 month market returns was close to zero. For the high
beta funds, the changes were consistent with the predictions in 9 out of 11
years, the exceptions (1967 and 1969) being relatively minor in nature.
The annual results help explain why the average of the 11 year fee
ratios increased for the high beta funds. When the 11 annual fee ratios
are averaged, the average annual fee ratio declines, as predicted by 0.04
percent (see table 2.7). The 11 year fee ratios, however, give more weight
to changes in the later years of the simulation period when the fund net
asset values are larger. One year in particular contributes substantially
to the result -- 1970. The average market return was at its lowest value
during the 11 year test period in 1970. Under Plan 1, the average 1970
fee ratio was -19.7 percent. Thus, the typical high beta fund adviser would
have lost 20 percent of his basic fee in performance penalties. Under Plan
2 this loss was cut in half, with an average fee ratio of -9.7 percent. This
large gain, particularly in a later year when fund assets were larger, offset
many of the smaller reductions in earlier years.
When the annual fee ratios are regressed on the annual beta values
(see equation 13), the slopes of the Plan 1 regression lines range from a
high of 57.4 percent (1967) to a low of -58.7 percent (1962). The t statis-
tics for the slopes show the relationships to be significant at the 5 percent
level in 9 out of 11 years. The sign of the relationship tends to be in the
direction of the market, as predicted by the theory (exceptions are 1963,
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1966 and 1969). For Plan 2, the sensitivity of the results to fund betas
is substantially reduced. The average absolute value of the estimated regres-
32.1
sion slopes is/for Plan 1, and 21.9 for Plan 2. Under Plan 2 the average
absolute value of the t statistics for the slopes was reduced from 5.2 to
3.3. The slopes of the regression lines for Plan 1 exceed the Plan 2 values
(in absolute terms) in all but three years (1963, 1966 and 1970). Thus, Plan
2 substantially reduced the dependence of advisory compensation on beta and
market return.
(3) Fee Ratio Standard Deviation Summary Results
The average fee ratio standard deviation for Plan 1 is 22.8 per-
cent. As predicted the average for the high beta funds was substantially
greater than for the low beta funds (30.9 and 16.7 percent respectively).
The shape of the fee ratio standard deviation versus beta scattergram (see
figure 2.6) is in line with the predicted shape (see figure 2.2). The fee
ratio standard deviations decline with increasing beta for betas less than 1,
and rise sharply for beta values greater than 1. When the three bond funds
are eliminated, the negative slope for the low beta funds is substantially
25/
reduced.-- For Plan 2 the averages are smaller, equalling 20.50, 29.21 and
13.96 percent for the total sample and high and low beta subsamples respec-
tively. The relationship between the fee ratio standard deviations and beta
is almost flat for betas less than 1, and rising for betas greater than 1,
A
but less sharply than for Plan 1 ( 1 = 37.50 and 24.09 for the high beta sub-
samples for Plans i and 2 respectively). When the bond funds are deleted,
the standard deviations increase over the low beta range as well.26/
Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of differences between Plans 1
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and 2. The result is roughly in line with the predictions; 31 of the 49 funds
have lower fee ratio standard deviations under Plan 2, including 10 of the
low beta funds and 8 of the high beta funds. As predicted, the funds with the
highest and lowest beta values have the largest decreases. The slope of
the regression line of the differences versus beta is equal to 17.35 and -13.41
percent for the low and high beta subsamples, both coefficients significant
at the 5 percent confidence level.
F. Summary
Our findings in Part II can be summarized as follows:
1. For the 49 funds as a group, fee Plan 1 made little impact on the
total amount of compensation received. During the 11 year period the total
advisory compensation received was 18.84 million dollars, of which only 0.06
million resulted from performance compensation. The average 11 year fee
ratio (Performance Fee/Basic Fee) was -0.62 percent, thus, the average fund
registered a performance penalty of 0.6 percent of its basic fee. While the
group effect was small, the impact on the amount of compensation received
from individual funds varied substantially among funds. Performance fee
ratios ranged from a high of 18 percent to a low -26 percent. The tendency
was for the low beta funds to have lower fee ratios. The average fee ratio
for funds with beta values less than 1.0 was -2.8 percent, compared with 2.3
percent for funds with betas exceeding 1. 20 of the 28 low beta funds had
negative fee ratios, as opposed to only 4 of the 21 high beta funds. Thus,
while Plan 1 had little aggregate effect, its results for individual funds
were biased against those with lower betas.
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2. The positive relationship between total fee ratio and beta pre-
viously observed for Plan 1 is confirmed by regression analysis. On average,
a 1 unit increase in fund beta is associated with a 11.2 percent increase
in fee ratio. Differences in beta values account for about 16 percent of the
total variation in fee ratios. The relationship is much stronger for the
low beta funds. Here, beta differences account for 40 percent of the varia-
tion in fee ratios. A 1 unit beta increase is associated with a 23.7 percent
increase in total fee ratio. For the high beta funds the picture is not as
clear. For these 21 funds, total fee ratio actually declined with increased
beta. However, the negative correlation is largely due to the influence of
two "outlier" funds with high betas and very low fee ratios. When these are
removed from the sample, the correlation between fee ratio and beta for the
high beta funds is insignificantly different from zero. The lack of the
positive correlation predicted by the theory is due, at least in part, to
the lower degree of diversification of the high beta funds. Thus, the pre-
dicted relationship is obscured by the non-market related residual variation
in fund returns.
3. Shifting from Plan 1 to 2 had several effects. First, the average
incentive compensation increased to 0.69 million dollars. Second, the
average 11 year fee ratio increased by 3.9 to 3.3 percent. Third, the bias
against the low beta funds was removed. The average fee ratio for the low
beta funds increased by 6.3 to 3.5 percent, 27 of the 28 funds showing increases.
Surprisingly, even the high beta group showed a small increase, with the
average 11 year fee ratio increasing by 0.75 to 3.1 percent. The result is
counter-intuitive, since the theory predicted that risk adjustment would reduce
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the compensation paid by the high beta funds. As discussed, however, the
result is due to the fee gains in the down markets in later years (e.g. 1970)
when the asset base was larger outweighing the effect on the 11 year fee
ratios of the earlier and more numerous fee reductions in up markets. The
average of the 11 year by year fee ratios (which is not as influenced by the
asset growth during the simulation period) declined as predicted, but by
a small and statistically insignificant amount.
4. The removal of the beta bias is confirmed by the fee ratio versus
beta regression analysis. For the total sample the correlation between
fee ratios and beta is close to zero. For the low beta funds there is a small
but statistically insignificant positive corresltation. The correlation for
the high beta funds is negative, again resulting from the two "outlier funds."
When these are removed the correlation is insignificantly different from zero.
Thus, the use of the risk adjusted measure of performance appears to have
successfully removed the beta bias against low beta funds implicit in the
current practice type of incentive fee arrangements. The impact of risk
adjustment on the high beta funds is inconsistent, the average change in
fee ratios not being significantly different from zero.
5. The use of incentive fee plans resulted in substantial year to year
variability in advisory compensation. Under Plan 1 the average fee ratio
standard deviation was 23 percent. Thus, as a rule of thumb, two thirds
of the annual fee ratios lay in the range from -23 percent to 23 percent,
95 percent between -46 percent to 46 percent. The average for the high
beta funds was 30.9 percent, much larger than the 16.7 percent average for
the low beta funds. Thus, as predicted, high beta funds had substantially
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larger fee ratio variations, resulting primarily from less diversification.
The use of Plan 2 removes the smaller performance measurement component of
fee variation, leaving the residual component. Average fee ratio standard
deviations declined 2.3 percentage points for the 49 fund sample. The
reduction was largest for the lower beta funds, 2.7 percent compared with
1.7 percent for the higher beta funds.
6. The relationship between fee ratio standard deviation and beta
differs markedly for the low and high beta funds. Under Plan 1 the standard
deviation decreases with increasing beta for beta values less than 1, and
rises sharply for values greater than 1.0. For plan 2, the relationship is
reasonably flat for beta values less than 1, and rising for values greater
than 1, but less sharply than in the case of Plan 1. A one unit increase in
beta for the high beta funds is associated with increases in standard deviation
of 37.5 and 24.1 percentage points under Plans 1 and 2 respectively.
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III. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The purpose of Part III is to test the sensitivity of the compen-
sation that would have been received under Plans 1 and 2 to changes in the
way in which investment performance is measured.
We have selected five aspects of the performance measures used
in Part II for further study. These are:
A. The magnitude of expenses assigned to the comparison
standards
B. The use of fiscal year-end performance measurement and
fee computation as opposed to the Part II rolling
month-by-month calculations
C. The choice of market indices other than the Standard
and Poor's 500 Index
D. The use of performance "null zones" based on the level
of statistical significance of the funds excess returns
E. The use of performance measurement horizons longer than
the 12-month period used in Part II.
The analyses were conducted by making the appropriate changes
in the two incentive-fee plans and repeating the Part II calculations.
In total, nine simulation cases were run -- one for each change in the
performance measure examined. The nine alternatives are described in
Table 3-1. In each replication, only one change was made from the basic
fee plans of Part II so that the effect could be isolated.
Part III is organized into five sections, one for each of the
above topics. The simulation results are summarized in the text, and presented in
__·_____1_1·__1__1_111_--^-__1·· .·-----(-·^---1I·l_.l_- _----
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detail in Tables 3-3 through 3-6. Tables 3-3 and 3-4 present
summary statistics for the fee ratio changes, and tables 3-5 and
3-6 the fee ratio standard deviation changes. The analytical
results of Part II are extended in Appendix B to include the various changes
considered. These analyses permit prediction to be made for comparison
with the simulation results.
The impact of the performance measurement changes for each plan
is measured by the difference in the fee ratios and fee ratio standard
deviations between the modified or alternative plan, and the base plans as
used in Part II. The fee ratio differences (designated residuals) for
each fund are given by
k k kRES = FEE -FEE1: A Be-~,, (15)
where FEEk and FE E are the plan k (k = 1, 2) 11-year fee ratios for the
alternative case (A) and the base case (B). The fee ratio standard devia-
tion residuals are given by
k k -RES = FSD - FSD2 A B (16)
k k
where FSD k and FSD k are the Plan 1 and 2 fee ratio standard deviations
for the alternative and base cases.
The format of each of the tables 3-3 through 3-6 is the same:
Column (1) gives the mean residual for the 49-fund sample; column (2),
the standard deviation of the residuals; column (3), the t statistic for
the mean residual (mean residual/standard error of mean); columns (4)
and (5), the minimum and maximum residual values; column (6), the number
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of funds with positive residuals; column (7) summarizes the regression
equation between the residuals and the 12-year average fund betas. The
column entries include the sign of the correlation coefficient (+ or -),
an asterisk (*) if the regression coefficient was significant at the 5
percent level, and the regression R2 . The results are presented for the
total 49-fund sample as well as for the 21-fund high and 28-fund low beta
subsamples used in Part II.
A. Operating Expense Tests -- Cases 1 and 2
At the present time there is no precedent for reducing the
return on the comparison standard to reflect a reasonable level of fund
operating expenses. As discussed in Part II, the failure to so adjust
the standard results in a performance measure which is biased against
the fund adviser. In our Part II simulations we allocated certain ex-
penses to the comparison standards for each of the 49-sample funds. We
now examine the sensitivity of these results to changes in the values of
the allocated expenses. In sensitivity analysis case 1 we examine the
incentive fee changes resulting from omission of the expense adjustment
(i.e. current practice). In case 2 we examine the impact of doubling the
assigned factors. While there may be some question regarding the appro-
priateness of the so-called "normal" expense levels used in Part II, the
doubled values would generally be considered as upper bounds. The cost
parameters for the Part II calculations and the two sensitivity cases
are summarized in Table 3-2.
For Plan 1 the omission of the expense adjustment will raise the
return on the comparison standard by 0.25 to 0.35 percent per year depend-
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ing on the size of the fund being evaluated. Given the scaling factor 6
is approximately equal to 4.0, the average fee ratio is expected to decrease
by 1.20 percent. Doubling the expense ratio should produce a correspond-
ing change in the opposite direction. The fee ratio changes should not
depend on fund beta values, and fee ratio volatility should remain unchanged.
For Plan 2 the situation is somewhat more complicated. Funds
with beta values less than 0.97 have comparison standards with sufficient
liquid assets (i.e. at least 3 percent treasury bills) that the expense
ratio will be unaffected by higher borrowing costs. For these funds the
average fee ratio should change by + 1.12 percent for Cases 1 and 2 respec-
tively. For funds with beta values greater than 1.0 the predicted changes
are the same as for Plan 1.
Results
The amount of performance fee compensation that would have been
paid under plans 1 and 2 is extremely sensitive to the magnitude of the
expense ratio assigned to the comparison standard. The results were in
the direction predicted and approximately equal to the predicted magnitude
for every fund. For plan 1, the average fee ratio using the Part II "normal"
expenses was a deficit of 0.62. When the expense ratio is eliminated (case
1), the deficit triples to 1.73. When the fee ratio is doubled, the defi-
cit changes to an average payment of 0.82 percent of the basic fees received.
For plan 2, the average fee ratios are similarly sensitive to the fee ratio
assumed, ranging from 2.15 (zero expenses) to 3.32 (normal expenses) to 4.80
(double expenses) percent of the basic fee.
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B. Fiscal Year-End Plans -- Case 3
Over half of the funds in the SEC survey [ ] used fiscal year-
end as opposed to rolling monthly or quarterly performance calculation.
For these plans the annual incentive fee would thus be based on a single
year end measure of performance, rather than twelve month-by-month measures.
As shown in Appendix B, this should tend to result in slightly higher average
fee ratios during the 12-year period,27 coupled with very substantial
increases in fee ratio standard deviations.
Results
The use of fiscal year as opposed to rolling monthly performance
measurement resulted in more compensation for 63 percent of the sample
funds under plan 1 and 75 percent under plan 2. Average plan 1 fee ratios
increased from -0.62 to -0.07 percent of basic fe compensation. For plan
2, the average fee ratio increased from 3.32 to 4.84 percent. At the same
time, the compensation for every fund under plans and 2 became more
volatile, the average increase in the fee ratio standard deviations equal-
ing 40 percent of the base case values.
C. Alternative Index Tests -- cases 4, 5 and 6
65 of 103 plans included in the SEC 1972 Survey [ ] used the
Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Composite Index, 14 used the NYSE composite,
and ten the Dow Jones 30 Industrials. However, almost none of the advisers
adjusted the index return to include dividend distributions. To examine
the impact of omitting dividends on the index, we have selected the S & P.
500 Index without dividend adjustment as the first alternative index.28 '
For the second and third alternatives we have selected a substantially less
volatile index (The Dow Jones 30 Stock Industrial) and a more volatile
,,. . . . . .
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index (an unweighted index of all NYSE stocks).
Results
These tests point up the implications for advisory compensation
of the use of inappropriate indices.
The Standard and Poor 500 without dividends is inappropriate
since it excludes the dividend component of index return (approximately
3.5 percent per year during the simulation period). The use of this index
resulted in an average increase i performance compensation of 12.2 percent
of the base fee for plan 1, with every fund having increased compensation.
Under plan 2, the average increase was 11.3 percent, with the higher beta
funds increasing the most. Fee rtio standard deviations were not signifi-
cantly affected for either plan.
The Dow Jones 30 Stock Industrial Average does not reflect the
composition of the equities markeg. If is made up of less risky stocks
which are expected to have lower han average realized returns. Thus, the
Dow Jones 30 will tend to be an "asier" plan 1 standard than the S & P
500. This prediction was confirmed by the simulation results. For plan
1, every fund had increased compensation, the average fee ratio increasing
by 5.71 percent. The Dow, during the 12-year simulation period, also turned
out to be an easier standard on a risk-adjusted basis (on a risk-adjusted
basis, the Dow had a negative alpha of 0.11 percent per month relative to
the S & P 500). For plan 2, 40 of 49 sample funds had increased fees, with
an average fee ratio increase of 2.52.
The unweighted NSE Index is also unrepresentative of the typical
mutual fund portfolio. Since it gives disproportionate weight to the
_._ 1_1~~~~~__ I~~~_ _ X ~~~~^ _ ^II~~~~_ __ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~__^ _  · _1-I~~~~ ^ ~- -- -- -
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smaller and typically more risky NYSE stocks, it will on the average tend
to have higher realized returns. Thus, it will be a more difficult plan
1 standard. This prediction is confirmed by the decreased compensation of
almost every sample fund, the average fee ratio decreasing by 9.5 percent.
The unweighted NYSE index also turned out to be a more difficult standard
on a risk-adjusted basis as well. (The unweighted NYSE had a positive
alpha of 0.10 percent per month relative to the S & P 500). Forty-seven
funds had lower plan 2 compensation with the NYSE Index, the average fee
ratio decline equalling 6.3 percent.
D. Null Zone Tests -- Cases 7 and 8
A substantial portion of existing incentive fee plans incorporate
a "null zone" which prohibits performance fee payments or penalties for re-
turn differentials between the null zone limits.29 For example, a + 5
percentage point null zone would eliminate incentive fee adjustments for
12-month return differentials between -5 and 5 percent. The purpose of
the null zone is to prohibit payments or penalties for return differentials
which are not "significantly different from zero."
The SEC, in Investment Advisers Act Release number 315 [ ],
while apparently supporting the null zone concept, focussed almost entirely
on the conditions under which the maximum fee could be paid.30
As a matter of elementary fairness the performance differences
from which the maximum fee adjustment results should be set so as
to preclude such maximum fee adjustment resulting from insignificant
or random differences. Through a statistical analysis of the per-
formance of the investment company relative to the performance of
the index throughout the year, it is possible to determine whether
or not the investment performance of the investment company differs
significantly from the investment record of the index. Ideally,
under any particular performance fee contract there should be at
least a 90 percent probability that the maximum fee adjustment will
not result from random fluctuations in performance.
--- ~ ~1_1_1 I~-- ^-^ _ __-~~
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The Commission further suggested that preliminary studies indicated that
± 10 percentage point interval would be sufficient "as a rule of thumb" to
provide the required confidence level. It was further suggested that these
limits could be reduced for large, well diversified investment companies.3 1
The SEC also proposed the use of a "t" statistic to determine the de-
gree of statistical significance associated with a given return differen-
tial (see Appendix B for a description).
Concerning the null zone itself, the Commission appears to be recommend-
ing a similar type of confidence requirement, but at a lower level of significance
than for the maximum fee payment.
Of course, similar considerations are required for fee adjustemnts
that are less than the maximum. In other words, meaningful fee adjust-
ments may occur at levels which are less than the maximum and therefore,
like maximum adjustments, they should be based upon significant performance
differences. (The level of confidence that such lesser fee adjustments
are based upon meaningful performance differences may be less than 90
percent.) This may be accomplished by the use of null zones of appropriate
size or of a fee structure under which the effect of small performance dif-
ferences is not proportionally greater than the effect of large performance
differences.
Thus, the Commission appears to be suggesting a two tier significance
test -- a lower level of confidence for any incentive fee payment or penalty,
and a higher level for the maximum adjustment. This type of rule has inherent
complexities which have not been dealt with in the Release. For example,
suppose the plan 1 performance differential exceeds the 18 percent maximum
premium limit, but the differential was only different from zero of the 60
percent level; what proportion of the maximum fee could be collected? Or,
if a 1 percent differential was significant at the 90 percent level, could
the maximum fee be paid? The Release appears to be mixing two issues --
the determination of significance and, the size of the return differentail
required before the maximum fee is paid. In our minds, these are separate
questions.
In simulation cases 7 and 8 we have added null zone features to
__ _I_
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the two basic plans. These prohibit incentive fee payments or penalties
during any month in which the 12-month return differential is not signifi-
cantly different from zero at a specified level of statistical significance.
The confidence intervals are measured in terms of the variation in the
month-to-month differential returns during the performance measurement
horizon. A 12-month differential (R - R ) is considered to be statis-Pt st
tically different from zero if and only if the mean monthly return
differential exceeds some number (TMIN ) of standard deviations of the
mean. The confidence levels used were the 60%(TMIN = 1.0) and the
8 5%(TMiN = 1.6) levels. The test statistic, designated t, is equal to
the ratio of the mean monthly differential return to the standard devia-
tion of the mean. Thus, performance payments or penalties exist only
for months in which the absolute value of t exceeds TMIN, and then take
place in the usual manner prescribed in part II.
The analyses in appendix B indicate that the plan 1 t test is biased in
favor of higher risk funds. For periods with positive market risk premiums,
the analysis demonstrates that funds with betas greater than 1 will tend to have
positive t statistics, and conversely for funds with betas less than 1.0. The
same type of bias applies equally to any plan 1 null zone which is symmetric
about zero. For plan 2 the t test and symmetric null zones give unbiased re-
sults because the comparison index has the same volatility as the fund. Thus,
only for plan 2 will funds of various beta values be treated in a consistent
manner.
Our analysis also shows that the null zones sizes
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for both plans are very sensitive to fund beta values. Thus, it would
be impossible to specify a fixed null zone for all funds (eg. 10%),
even as a rule of thumb. Further, the simulations show that for a given
beta value, the null zones sizes will change substantially over time.
This is illustrated in table A.1 of Appendix A, where the t statistics
associated with given levels of the mean return differentials change
substantially over the three years of simulation results shown (see
columns 7 and 8).
Results
The effect of using null zones based on the standard error of
the mean monthly excess returns were most significant for the lower beta
funds. For plan 1, the requirement of a minumum test statistic of 1.0
virtually eliminated the average fee ratio penalty paid by the low beta
funds. The result for the high beta funds was much less consistent.
While the fee ratios of individual funds were substantially changed, the
average reduction in fee ratio was small and not statistically significant.
Under plan 2, the average fee ratio for the low beta funds were reduced by
approximately one-third of the base case value for TMIN = 1.0, and by two-
MINthirds for TMiN - 1.6. The average for the high beta funds was reduced by
about one third for TMIN = 1.0, and was not significantly affected by the
further increased in TMIN to 1.6. Thus, the null zones appeared to have
the greatest impact on the incentive compensation of the lower beta funds,
leaving that of the higher beta funds more or less intact.
E. 36-Month Performance Horizon Tests -- Case 9
A majority of the funds in the SEC Survey [ ] (93 out of 103)
use a 1-year performance measurement horizon. Of the remainder, over
half (6 out of 10) used a 36-month horizon. In case 9 we examine the im-
pact on advisory compensation of shifting from a 12 to 36-month perform-
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ance measurement horizon. The monthly incentive fee is based on the re-
turn differential over the previous 36 months, as applied to the 36-month
average asset base. The simulation results are based on the 1963-1971
period (as opposed to the usual 1961-1971 period) since two additional
years were required to initialize the 36-month fee plans. For comparison,
the base case fee results were computed for the same time period.
As shown in Appendix B, the 36-month horizon is predicted to
increase the beta bias in compensation levels; that is, compensation for
the low beta funds will be further decreased, and increased for the higher
beta funds. TaE change results from the current practice of not annualizing
the 36-month performance differential prior to making the incentive fee
calculation. The longer horizon is predicted to have no effect on the
average plan 2 fee ratios. The fee ratio standard deviation for both
plans 1 and 2 are predicted to increase substantially under the longer
performance measurement horizon.
Results
For plan 1, the 36-month horizon increased the correlation
between fee ratios and beta, thus increasing the beta bias in incentive
fee payments. Average fee ratios increased for the higher beta funds
and decreased for the lower beta funds. The beta bias was most pronounced
within the low beta subsample, having been weakened for the higher beta
funds by the larger proportion of non-market-related variation in fund
returns. Under plan 2, there was no significant impact on the average
incentive fee compensation resulting from the longer horizon. For both




IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
Our conclusions can be organized into two parts, which we shall
designate as technical and substantive. The first deals with the mechanical
aspects of fee plan design, the second deals with the central issue of
choice of an appropriate index. The technical conclusions follow largely




The performance comparison between a fund and its comparison index
will be meaningful only if the index represents a viable investment alterna-
tive to the fund. The standard should not represent a theoretical and unob-
tainable target but an alternative in which the fund assets could have been
invested.
When fund return net of expenses is compared directly with the in-
dex, the result is biased against the fund since the index portfolio is as-
sumed to operate costlessly. The index return should be reduced by an amount
which reflects a reasonable level of operating costs. Conversely, this
amount could be added back to the fund return before comparing it with the
index.
It should be carefully noted that we are concerned only with the
operating component and not with the advisory fee portion of total fund expenses.
Since the comparison portfolio is mechanically revised to follow the com-
position of an index (such as the S & P 500 stock composite index) no ad-
visory fee is required, nor any brokerage fees resulting from implementing
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portfolio strategies. The expenses which are relevant are administrative
(shareholder record keeping etc.), liquidity enpenses (i.e. maintaining a
certain parcentage of net assets in liquid form) and the brokerage costs of
investing net cash flows to the fund. To the extent that the latter cost
is covered by a sales charge or entrance fee, it would be eliminated from
consideration along with the advisory fee and portfolio brokerage.
The obvious question relates to what is a reasonable level of
expenses, and who should decide what is reasonable. The question is com-
plicated by the wide variety of fund sizes and types. One suggestion would
be to have the SEC propose a set of guidelines parameterized by fund size
and type. A second and perhaps preferable suggestion would permit independ-
ent fund directors to prescribe the appropriate adjustment to the fund standard.
This would amount to partitioning the fund's total expense ratio into advisory
and operating related components, and allocating the later to the index.
This method would permit the maximum degree of flexibility in tailoring com-
parison index expense ratios.
2. Fiscal Year Horizons
The use of the fixcal year method has two consequences. First, it
reduces the lag in performance fee payment, since the fee is based on the
average assets during the previous twelve months rather than the previous
twenty-four months as in the case of the rolling twelve month plan. If assets
are increasing (decreasing) the annual fee ratios will tend to be slightly
larger (smaller) in the fiscal year case. (Any gain to the adviser, however,
is at least partially offset by delays in receiving payment under this option
1_11__ __1_____1____1___l__ll__r_^____l_ 
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-- see footnote 27.) The primary effect of the fiscal year-end method is a sub-
stantial increase in fee ratio volatility. In our simulations, volatility was
increased by 40 percent on average over the rolling 12-month fee plans. Thus,
while we would not recommend abolition of this option, we really see very
little to recommend it.
3. Performance Fee Null Zones
The construction of a meaningful null zone is not a simple matter.
Its size depends on the beta of the fund, the index used for performance measure-
ment and the market conditions during the evaluation period.
When a symmetric null zone centered on zero is used, it will have an
unbiased effect only for situations where the index has the same volatility as
the fund. When an inappropriate index is used, the null zone will be biased in
favor of higher beta funds, and against lower beta funds. There is no easy solu-
tion to this plan 1 type beta bias, other than selecting an index of the same
volatility as the fund (see Section IVB below).
Our results further indicate that the size of the null zone associated
with a specified degree of statistical confidence depends on several factors --
the degree of fund diversification, market conditions during the performance
measurement horizon, and, in the case of plan 1, beta. Thus, any attempt to
prescribe fixed null zones for all funds, or even for particular funds over time,
would not be useful, even as a rule of thumb.
Since the purpose of the null zone is to prohibit incentive fee pay-
ments or penalties for return differentials which are not "significantly differ-
ent from zero," it would seem appropriate to base the null zone sizes on the




formance horizon. In the case of the rolling fee plans, this approach would
provide a continually updated null zone tailored specifically to the fund and
time period being considered.
4. Performance Measurement Horizon
Under existing incentive fee regulation there appears to be no re-
quirement to coordinate the length of the performance measurement horizon with
the other parameters of the plan, specifically the limits for which the maximum
fee is paid and the rate of incentive fee payment per percent return differential
(i.e. 61 -- see equation 11). For example, incentive fee plans with 1, 2 or 3
year horizons could have the same 10 percent limits for maximum fee payments,
and the same 0.022 percent incentive fee rate.
Extending the horizon, while keeping the other parameters the same, in-
creases the magnitude of the plan 1 beta bias in incentive compensation. This
follows because the slope of the relationship between expected fee ratios and
beta is proportional to the expected market risk premium during the performance
measurement period; increasing the horizon increases the expected risk premium,
and thus increases the slope.
Two solutions are available to eliminate this effect. The first
would increase the limits for the maximum fee payment to correspond with the
longer norizon, and reduce the incentive fee rate for a 1 percent return dif-
ferential (i.e. reduce 6). For example, the limits for the maximum fee pay-
ment would be increased from 18 to 54 percent for the 36-month version of
plans 1 and 2, and the incentive fee rate reduced from 0.022 percent to 0.007
percent per percentage point differential. The second solution is to annaul-
ize the return differentials for horizons for longer than one year. For example,
__I___I___I__C____II·^--·------- -
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a 12 percent three-year differential would be annualized to a four percent
difference before the incentive fee is computed. This method is preferable
since it facilitates investor comparisons among fee plans using different per-
formance measurement horizons.
Even on an annualized basis, however, the longer horizon fee plans
still benefit from the beta bias, since the probability that the annualized
market return will be positive increases with the length of the horizon.
Thus, annualizing the differential will mute, but not eliminate, the impact
of the beta bias.
The shift to plan 2 largely eliminated the beta bias in incentive
compensation. The changes in fee ratios for the 49 funds resulting from the
shift to the 36-month horizon were not significantly correlated with beta.
However, the failure to annualize the return differentials resulted in sub-
stantially higher fee ratio volatility under plan 2 as well as plan 1.
Thus, if performance fees with horizons longer than one year are
used, it would appear appropriate to annualize the return differential
prior to making the incentive fee calculation. This will reduce, but not
eliminate, the plan 1 beta bias, and will reduce the fee ratio volatility
under the longer horizon alternatives to levels comparable to the twelve
month plans.
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B. Substantive Conclusions: Choice of An Appropriated Index
Our Part II results clearly indicate that any incentive fee plan
based on performance measures against an index of different volatility than
the fund being evaluated have a beta vias. In years with up markets the bias
favors the high beta funds, that is, funds with beta values greater than
the index tend to have positive incentive compensation, and funds with beta
values less than the index negative incentive fees. In years with down mar-
kets the opposite effect occurs. Since up markets tend to outweigh the down
markets historically, and since investors typically expect the market to rise,
existing fee schemes are biased against low risk funds. This fact has not been
lost on the investment advisory fraternity. A majority of the funds in the
SEC 1972 [ ] Incentive Fee Survey have beta values greater than 1.0.33
The beta bias leads to two results:
(i) elimination of incentive fee options for the managers
of low risk funds (eg. income and balanced funds.)
(ii) Creation of an incentive for the advisory to increase
the volatility of his fund in order to increase his
expected compensation level.
The use of the beta adjusted index would seem to eliminate both of these
problems. The Part II results showed a zero correlation between fee ratios
and beta when the risk adjusted Plan 2 was used. The use of Plan 2 also re-
sulted in lower fee ratio volatility, especially for the lower beta funds. Thus,
the use of the market line beta adjustment would seem to be a step in the right
direction, particularly for the lower beta funds.
______I__ ___
_____ _____
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C. Directions for Further Research
Our analysis of incentive fees has been based on two measures of per-
formance -- a non-risk adjusted comparison with the market index (Plan 1) and
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, market line risk adjusted performance measures
(Plan 2). The results showed the CAPM standard to be preferable to the non-
risk adjusted performance standard.
Recently, however, a number of empirical studies (e.g. Friend and
Blume [ ], Black, Jensen and Scholes[ ], Fama and MacBeth [ 1) have in-
dicated that the average return on securities has tended to deviate system-
atically from the predictions of the CAPM. Though the observed risk-return
relationship appears to be linear, the slope of the line (the price of risk)
has, in general, been less than predicted by the CAPM. In short, the evidence
suggests that the ex post market line may not provide the best set of bench
marks for the average risk-return relationship in the market.from naively
selected portfolios. Thus, it may be possible to further refine our risk-ad-
justed atandard to reflect the divergence between the empirically determined
risk-return relationship and the CAPM market line. This examination is the
subject of a further paper [ ].
Appendix A
Description of the Incentive Fee Simulator
The calculations performed by the simulation program are relatively
straightforward. They can best be illustrated with the aid of an example.
Table A.1 shows three years of simulated month-by-month results for Plan 2
and Keystone K1 fund. We will briefly describe each of the columns.
Columns (1) and (2): Year and month end of fee calculation.
Column (3): Month end net asset value in millions of dollars
Column (4): Fund beta during previous twelve months ( p)
Column (5): Average monthly fund return during previous 12 months (r p)
Column (6): Average monthly return for the comparison standard during
previous 12 months (s), where
(r) = (rf) + p(rm - rf) -s f
where r and f are the average monthly returns on market
index and riskless lending rate (if p < 1) or borrowing
rate (if p >1) during previous 12 months. EX is the annual
expense ratio for the comparison portfolio (see colume 12 for







Differences between Columns (5) and (6), the average monthly
excess return during previous 12 months ()
t statistic for average excess return; t = &/SE , where SE is
the standard error of alpha. a a
12 month cummulative return for fund (R ).
12 month cummulative lending (if <1) or borrowing rate (if > 1).
The lending rate based on 30 day treasury bills, the borrowing
rate on the prime bank rate plus an increment which depends on
the size of the fund (RF).
12 month cummulative return on Standard and Poor's 500 Stock
Composite Index (M)








The expense ratio for the comparison portfolio for previous
12 months: sum of administrative plus brokerage fees on net
cash inflow to the fund plus liquidity expenses, unpressed
as a proportion of average assets during 12 month period (EX).
12 month cummulative return on the comparison portfolio (Rs),
Rs = R + p(R - R) - EX.
For plan 1 R would equal RM - EX.
12 month excess return for fund (R - R ).
p s
Amount of base fee earned during current month. Based on
average assets during month and computed at (1/12) of annual
rate (Millions of Dollars).
Amount of incentive fee earned during current month. Based
on 12 month excess return Up - R ) and average assets during
12 months, computed at (1/12) annual rate (Millions of Dollars).
Total advisory compensation for the month (sum of columns
15 and 16).
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Theory for Part III Sensitivity Analysis Cases
B. Fiscal Year End Fee Plans
The year-T performance fee ratio for the rolling twelve month plan
is given by (see equation 11)
12
FEEB (6/1 Xt(Rpt - Rst) (B1)BT / t=l t Pt t
For the fiscal year-end fee plan, the year T fee ratio is given by
FEEA = 6(R 1 2 - RS 1 2 ) (B2)A p,12 s,12 )
Assuming the differential return variables have the same expected values,
then the expected fee ratio under the fiscal year plan will equal the
rolling 12 month value times (12/EXt); that is
E(FEEAT) = (12/Xt) E(FEET) (B3)
Thus, the expected fee ratios will be equal only in the case where the assets
during the previous 24 months have remained constant; that is for Xt = 1
for t = 1, . .. , 12. Since the net assets of the sample funds increased
during the 12 year simulation period, we would expect advisory compensation
under the fiscal year plan to exceed that for the rolling 12 month plan.
The fee ratio standard deviations under the fiscal year-end plan
will exceed the rolling 12 month values by a factor between (12/EXt) and
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(12/ZXt) depending on the degree of intercorrelation among the twelve
one-year return differentials (R t - Rst). The first factor corresponds
to perfect correlation among the return differentials, the second to zero
correlation. Note that as the degree of intercorrelation declines, the
fiscal year-end fee ratio standard deviations increases substantially.
C. Alternative Index Cases
We first describe a general expression for the change in fee
ratio when an alternative index is used, and then specialize the result
for each index in turn. For analytical convenience we shall deal with
algebraic expressions for monthly fee ratios; however, any results so ob-
tained are easily generalizable to the annual or eleven year fee ratio.
The return on the base case comparison standards, R (k = 1, 2),
BS
for plans 1 and 2 are given by
~1 1
BS = RM EXB (B4a)
%S = R + (M - RF) B (B4b)
where RM and RF are the 12-month returns on the S & P 500 Index and risk-
less asset, and is the fund's beta value relative to the index. (For the
ease of exposition the t subscripts have been deleted from the return variables.)
~k
For the alternative case, the R (k = 1, 2) are given by
~2 1 1RAS = Rmn E (B5a)
AS RF + p(R - R EX (Bb)
wh 1 ith12mnhrtronhalentvinend1
where RN is the 12-month return on the alternative index, and p is the
1_1_ __I_____
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fund beta relative to this index.
The alternative case monthly fee ratio, FEE , is given by
FEE = 6(A t/At)(R -R S)
= 6 (R R- A
= 6 * RRP <S) + '(S RkS)
k *-k -k
FEEB+ 6*( %S NS) (B6)
where 6 is the scaling factor which converts 12 month differential returns
(RP - RS ) into performance fee ratios (note that in the no-growth case
6 =.6 = 4.0). Substituting from Equations (B4) and (B5) into Equation (B6),
we obtain
FEEA = FEEB + 6 ( RM ) (B7a)
FEEA = FEEB +6 {(P- Yp)( - RF) + -P R R )} (B7b)
For plan 1, the expected change in fee ratio is independent of
fund beta, depending only on the difference in index returns. For the
12-year simulation period, the average annual differences in return,
(R. - ), between the S & P 500 Index and 1) the S & P 500 without dividends,
2) the Dow Jones Industrial Index, and 3) the unweighted NYSE index were
3.24 percent, 1.80 percent, and -2.52 percent per year, respectively. Thus,
assuming 6 = 4.0, the alternate case average fee ratios are predicted to
increase by 12.96, 7.20, and -10.08 respectively, with the changes uni-
11_____1
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formly distributed with beta.
Under plan 2, the use of risk-adjusted performance measures will
reduce the effects of index changes. In fact, if the alternative indices
had risk-return characteristics such that any index was a linear combina-
tion of the risk-free rate and the Standard and Poor's 500 Index, then the
choice of indices would not affect the amount of performance fee compensa-
tion earned (i.e., p(RM - R) would equal Bp - RF), and thus RS would
-2
equal RAS). However, this is not the case. During the 12-year simulation
period the Dow 30 and S & P 500 without dividends had lower returns on a
risk adjusted basis than the S & P 500 index. These indices had alphas
equal to -0.11 and -0.28 percent per month respectively during the 12-year
test period. Thus, they are relatively easy standards on a risk adjusted
basis. The unweighted NYSE index on the other hand turned out to be a
more difficult standard on a risk adjusted basis, having a positive alpha
relative to the S & P 500 index of 0.10 percent per month. Thus, we would
expect the funds to have higher 11-year fee ratios relative to the first
two indices, and lower values relative to the third. Using the average
changes in fund beta values, (p - ), and the realized returns on the
alternative indices, , 34 the predicted increases in the average plan 2
fee ratios are 12.26 for the S & P 500 without dividends, 7.71 for the
Dow 30 Index, and -10.84 for the unweighted NYSE Index.
D. Null Zone Tests
To evaluate the statistical significance of the 12 month differ-
ential return (R - R ), we can examine the variation in the month-to-
pt st
month differences and test whether the mean monthly value can be considered
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significantly different from zero at a specified confidence level (e.g.
the 90 percent level). The null zone provision requires the mean differ-
ence to be more than a specified number (TMIN) of standard deviations
greater or less than zero before a fee is paid, or penalty exacted. The
value of (TMIN) depends on the confidence level required. This would
eliminate payments or penalties for "random" return differences between
the fund and its comparison standard.
The specification of the test differs slightly for plans 1 and
2. For plan 1 we have used the significance test proposed by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission.35 The test statistic is equal to the mean
monthly return difference between the fund and market index, divided by




where XS is the mean monthly differential and (XS) is the standard devia-
tion of the 12 monthly values. ta has a students t distribution with 11
degrees of freedom 3 6 (however, see later comments regarding bias in this
test).
For plan 2 the alpha value estimated from the regression of the
monthly fund returns on the market index is the average monthly differen-
tial return. The regression analysis also provides a test statistic for
alpha:
ta = SE^ (B8b)
where a is the estimated alpha and SEA its standard error. t in this casea a
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also has a students t distribution but with ten degrees of freedom.
Given an estimated value for t , we can use probability tables
for the students t distribution to determine the level of statistical
confidence associated with any particular value. Typical values are:
t value
Level of t value
Confidence % Degrees of Freedom
11 10





In practice the mean differences would likely be based on more frequent
observations than monthly; for example weekly or daily. This would sub-
stantially expand the number of degrees of freedom, hence lower somewhat
the TMIN required for a specified level of confidence. For example, the
required plan 1 t statistic based on weekly observations for a 90 percent
confidence interval would be 1.68, compared with 1.80 with 11 degrees of
freedom. Because of the small number of degrees of freedom for our
tests we have used somewhat lower confidence requirements in the simu-
lations.
The t tests described above, however, are unbiased only in the
case of plan 2. Under the CAPM assumptions the expected value for the plan
2 mean differential return (alpha) is equal to zero, and thus zero is
the appropriate null hypothesis for evaluating measured alpha values.
Appendix B.7
For plan 1 on the other hand the CAPM expected value of the mean differ-
ential is not zero, but equal to (p - l)(r M - rf), where (rM - rf) is
the mean monthly risk premium for the market during the 12 month horizon.
Thus, the appropriate null comparison for XS is not zero, but the above
value. If the test as given by equation (B8a) is used to measure the sig-
nificance of XS (as proposed by the SEC), the results will be biased in
favor of the funds with betas greater than 1.0, and against the low beta
funds. For example, a perfectly diversified portfolio (i.e. R = 1.0)
with beta equal to 1.5 and alpha equal to zero would have a ta value of
approximately 0.60 for a typical 12 month interval during the simulation
period.37 Conversely, a comparable fund with beta of 0.5 would have a t
value of -0.60. Thus, the higher beta funds start out with a "leg up" on
the test, the lower risk funds being conversely disadvantaged. The magni-
tude of the bias is somewhat lower for typical mutual, since they are not
perfectly diversified (R2 less than 1.0). Based on the data in table 2-1,
a fund with beta of 1.5 (and zero alpha) would, on average, have a ta val-
ue of approximately 0.25. For a beta of 0.5, the t would be -0.50.
The observed bias applies not only to the t test null zones, but
to any symmetrical null zone required regardless of how determined. As
long as the expected risk premium for the market is positive, the expected
differential return is positive for funds with beta values greater than 1,
and negative for funds with beta values less than 1. For example, a ten
percent per year risk premium would result in a five percent expected dif-
ferential return for a fund with beta of 1.5, and -5 percent for a fund
with beta of 0.5. Thus, if a ten percent null zone was to be used, it
should be centered around these expected values (eg. around 5 percent
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for a fund with beta of 1.5) and not zero. The CAPM model does not have
to be precisely true for this type of bias to exist. As long as higher
risk stocks on average tend to outperform the market this beta bias will
exist for null zones which are symmetrical about zero.3 9
The data in table 2.1 allows us to estimate the size of the
null zones that, on average, over the 12 year simulation period would be
associated with specified levels of statistical confidence. The figures
in column (4) (ignoring the 6 scaling factor) are estimates of the
standard deviations of the monthly differential returns for plan 1. The
standard error of the 12 month mean differences would equal the column (4)
figures divided by the square root of the number of observations (eg. v1-).
Thus, of the 90 percent confidence level (TMIN = 1.80) the null zones
would range from a high of +32 percent (on an annualized basis) for beta
of 1.5 to a low of +11 percent beta equal to 1.0. The 12 month standard
errors for the plan 2 alpha values tend to increase substantially with beta.
Thus, for plan 2 the null zones would be small for low beta funds and
large for high beta funds. Thus, it would not be possible to use a single
null zone (eg. +10 percent per year) for all funds, even as a rule of
thumb. Further, the size of the null zone for a given beta value will
change over time. This is illustrated by the three years of simulation
results shown for Keystone K1 fund in Table Al of Appendix A (see columns
7 and 8). As shown, the t values associated with any given mean dffer-
ential return changes substantially over the three years.
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The impact of a null zone on the expected fee ratio and fee
ratio standard deviation can be illustrated as follows. The incentive
fee ratio for month t using a null zone is given by
FEE · 6Z · (R - RkAt t pt st
Z FEE
~i < (B9)= t EBt
where Zt is equal to 1.0 if the absolute value of the test statistic Itc{
exceeds the required value TMIN, and zero if not. As TMIN is increased,
the probability p that It { will exceed TMIN approaches zero. Thus, the
expected fee ratio and fee ratio standard deviation will approach zero as
TMIN is increased. This is easily shown for the simple case where Zt is
assumed to be statistically independent of (Rpt - Rt) In this case the
expected value of Zt is equal to p, and
E(FEEAt) = p E(FEEBt) (BlOa))  
(FEE At) = p (FEEBt) (BlOb)
Thus, as TMIN increases, p will approach zero forcing the expected fee
ratio and fee ratio standard deviation to zero as well.
E. 36-Month Performance Horizon Tests
The use of the 36-month horizon has no effect on the form of the
fee ratio equations, as given by Equations (4) and (7) for plans 1 and 2
respectively. However, the plan 1 beta bias, resulting from the term
6*(8p - l)( t - t) will now be magnified. This follows because the
market risk premium ( t - Rt) is now measured over a 36- rather than a
I _ _I___^____I_^_I__II_· ___X II_II__I_____^ _1_^  XI ____ I  ·^  1 __1__ __ _11_1_111·--_1__ ------
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12-month interval. Since the current practice is not to annualize the
36 month return differential, or correspondingly multiply by three the dif-
ferential return required to earn the maximum premium (i.e. 54 percent for
plans 1 and 2 rather than 18 percent), then the expected slope of the re-
lationship between fee ratios and betas is increased by a factor of 3.
Since the plan 2 fee ratio does not depend on the value of t - t (see
Equation (7), the 36-month horizon should have no impact on the level of
compensation or its relationship to fund beta values.
The fee ratio standard deviation will be increased by the shift
to a 36-month horizon. The 36-month differential return can be approxi-
mately expressed as the sum of 36-month differences, that is
36 k
(Pt St) Z (pj - s (Bll)j=l
where rpj and rsi are as the month j fund and standard return. The monthly
fee ratio for the 36-month plan is thus given by
-k 36 k
FEEAt (p - .) (B12)
j=1
Given the random walk nature of security and portfolio returns, we can
safely assume that the monthly return differentials are not statistically
k
correlated. Assuming a constant standard deviation Cr for the monthly
differentials, then the fee ratio standard deviations for the 12- and 36-
month plans are given by
k - * k\: (Bl3a)
a(FEEBt) = 12 (B13a)
(FEEkt) = 6 6* k (B13b)Cr (FEE ) = 6' (B3b)
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and therefore
a(FEE t) - / o(FEE t) (B13c)
Thus, the average fee ratio standard deviations for both 36-month plans
are predicted to exceed those for the 12-month plans by a factor of approxi-
mately 1.8. Note that if the 36-month return differentials were annualized,
the 36-month plan would have the same fee ratio standard deviation as the
12-month plan.
Footnotes
1. Respectively, Professor and Associate Professor of Finance, Sloan School
of Management, M.I.T. This paper was originally prepared by us as parts
II and III of an unpublished manuscript entitled "A Study of Investment
Company Incentive Fee Arrangements." This research was supported by a
grant from the Investment Company Institute, Washington, D. C.
2. Source: SEC Institutional Investor Study [ ], p. 254.
3. SEC Survey of Incentive Fee Plans [ 1, p. 1.
4. Source: Letter of Transmittal to SEC Institutional Investor Study [ ],
p. XIV, last paragraph.
5. Op. Cit., p. XV, second paragraph.
6. Investment Advisers Act Release Number 315 [ ], "Selection of an Appro-
priate Index," pp. 3 and 4.
8. For example, the incentive compensation in existing plans are bounded above
and below at some' specified return differential between the fund and
comparison standard.
9. The relationship between a (Cp) and Bp was estimated for the 49 sample
using monthly data for the 12 year period from 1960 to 1971. Time series
estimates of a2(Cp) and Bp were obtained by regressing fund risk premiums
(returns less the 30 treasury bill rate) on the S & P 500 index risk
premiums. The relationship was then estimated cross-sectionally by re-
gressing a 2(Cp) on p. Since the relationship is non-linear, the re-
gression equation included a term 5P as well. The resulting equation is
2() = 4.17 14.9 + 16.422 (R2 = 0.62)




The figures in brackets are the t statistics for the regression
coefficients.
10. The values in Table 2.1 are based on monthly calculations. Thus, the
fee ratio standard deviation, (FEE p), is for a one month performance
measurement horizon. In the simulation calculations, however, a 12 month
performance measurement horizon is used. Thus, the annual fee ratio
standard deviations will exceed the monthly values by a factor of /1i,
given the independence property of the monthly returns. The shape of
the o(FEE ) versus curve, therefore, will remain unchanged.
11. The basic fee schedule was suggested by the Investment Company Institute
as representative of typical rates during the 1960-1971 period. For the
103 performance fee plans surveyed by the SEC [ ] in January of 1972,
74 percent had a maximum basic fee rate (payable on the first increment
of net assets) between 0.50 and 0.75 percent.
12. 93 of the 103 performance fee plans in existence in January 1972 measured
performance over a 1 year horizon. Of these 24 used a rolling 12 month
calculation, and 57 a single fiscal year-end measure (REF SEC SURVEY [ ],
Table II, Page 6). The effect of this difference is examined in Part III.
13. 63 percent of the 103 performance fee plans in existence in January 1972
measured fund performance relative to the S & P 500 stock index (REF SEC
SURVEY [ ], Table I, p. 5). However, almost none of these funds adjusted
the index for dividend distributions (op. cit. Table IX, p. 13). The
questions of index choice and treatment of dividends are examined in Part III.
14. Industry sources were polled to provide estimates of the fund borrowing
rates, as a function of fund size. For large funds (500 million or more
assets) the prime rate was used. For medium size funds (100-500 million)
the rate was increased by 0.25 percent per year. For small funds (under
100 million) the rate was increased by 0.50 percent per year.
Footnotes 3
15. For the 103 incentive fee plans in existence as of January 1972,
the maximum performance fee adjustment for 53 percent of the funds oc-
curred for return differentials between 6 and 10 percentage points.
The largest differential used was ±24 percentage points (Ref. SEC SURVEY
[ ], Table VII, p. 11). The ±18 percent limits used in the simulations
are patterned after the Oppenheimer Fund performance fee plan (prospectus
dated April 12, 1972).
16. Approximately one half of the 103 plans in existence as of January 1972
had performance fee adjustments which increased and decreased continuously
as the return differential increased and decreased, and the other half had
fee adjustments which changed only for discrete changes in the return
differential. (REF. SEC SURVEY [ ], Table X, p. 14). The 0.022 percent
continuously varying rate used in the simulations is patterned after the
Oppenheimer Fund performance fee plan.
17. Rule 205.2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [ ] requires that
the same asset base be used for computing both the base and performance
fees; for example, the average assets during the previous 12 months. When
a rolling period fee plan (such as Plan 1 or 2) is used, however, the
base fee can be based on the average asset value during the most recent
subperiod of the rolling period. This is our rationale for computing the
basic fee on the average assets during the month, while computing the
performance fee on the average net assets during the previous 12 months.
18. See fottnote 14 for the definition of the fund size categories.
19. The funds are Equity Progress Fund (S = 1.35) and the Value Line Special
Situations Fund ( = 1.53). When these two funds are removed from the
sample, the slope of the regression line (y1) is -5.5 percent, with tl = -1.0




20. The slope of the regression line for the 46 fund sample is 7.34 percent,
with t1 = 1.48, and R = 0.05.
21. The slope of the 25 fund low beta sample is 34.70 percent, with tl = 3.15
and R - 0.30.
22. For the 28 fund low beta sample, the standard deviation of the distribution
of the fund betas is 0.25. When the three bond funds are removed, it is
reduced by almost half, to 0.14. The primary reason for including the
3 bond funds was to obtain this wider dispersion of fund betas.
23. The regression slope for the high beta sample excluding the two outliers
is -5.45 percent, with tl - 0.80 and R = 0.04.
24. For the 46 fund sample, Y1 = -2.27 percent, with t = -0.50 and R2 = 0.01
For the 25 fund low beta sample, y1 = 18.18 percent, with tl = 1.83 and
R = 0.13.
fee regression line
25. The slope of the/ratio standard deviation versus beta/for the low risk
subsample (excluding the 3 bond funds) is -8.60 percent, with t statistic
of -1.46 and R of 0.09.
26. The slope of the regression line for the low beta subsample if 9.96
percent, with t value of 1.58 and R2 of 0.12.
27. The advantage of slightly higher compensation under the fiscal year
plan is at least partially offset by the delay in receiving a substantial
portion of the total advisory compensation. Section 205 of the Investment
Advisers Act prohibits interim performance fee payments. For the
fiscal year-end plan this means that only the minimum possible level
of advisory fees can be collected on a monthly basis during the year
(i.e. the base or fulcrum fee rate less the maximum possible performance
penalty rate). The rest is collected at the end of the year after the
final performance is known. Under the rolling period scheme, however,
Footnotes 5
the advisory fee earned during the most recent subperiod (eg. month)
of the rolling horizon can be paid. This permits the adviser to
receive the base fee for the last month plus or minus the most recent
12-month incentive fee adjustment. Thus, the adviser receives his
fee at a reasonably continuous rate, rather than receiving a balloon
payment at year end. See Investment Advisers Act Release No. 315 [ ],
page 5.
28. Since August of 1972, when the Advisers Act Rule No. 205-1 was adopted
the return on the index used in a performance fee plan must include the
reinvestment of cash dividends of the companies which comprise the
index. However, we include this case in order to examine the impact
on advisory compensation of this regulatory change.
29. 57 percent of the 103 performance fee plans in existence in January 1972 em-
ployed a performance fee null zone. The most common null zones fell into
the range between +1 percentage point and +5 percentage points (approximately
43 percent of the 103 plans). The null zones were all centered about a
zero return differential between the fund and the index used (Ref. SEC
Survey [ ], Table VI, page 10).
30. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 315 [ ], page 9, paragraph 2.
31. Op cit., page 9, paragraph 3 and footnote.
32. Op. cit., page 10, paragraph 2 and footnote.
33. 40 of the 103 funds in the SEC Incentive Fee Survey [ ] had suffici-
ent history or assets to have beta measures included in the Wiesenberger
December 1972 mutual fund performance survey [ i. The betas were
based on monthly returns for from 1 to 10 year periods (depending
Footnotes 6
on data availability) ending in November 1972, and were computed rela-
tive to the S & P 500 Stock Composite Index. The following gives the
distribution of the 40 values.
The average beta was 1.34, with only 7 funds with betas less than 1.0.
The maximum betas were 1.95 and 2.31.
34. 7-For the S & P 500 without dividends, p = 0.946, RM = 0.78% per month;
for the Dow Jones, 8p = 0.785, = 0.90% per month; for the unweighted
NYSE Index, -p = 0.776, = 1.26% per month; for the S & P 500, = 1.05%
per month, and ~ = 0.34% per month. The betas of the three alternative
indices versus the S & P 500 were 1.00, 0.94, and 1.02 respectively.
35. The t test formula proposed by the SEC differs from ours in one respect;
the differential return is measured by the difference in the natural
logarithms of the fund and market index returns. However, this change
will make little or no difference in practice, particularly when short
intervals such as weeks or months are used to measure the return
differences.





where XSj rpj - rMj, rpj and rMj being the subperiod returns
on the fund and market index. The standard deviation of the N
return differentials is given by
ar(XS) ( {(XS -XS)
J-1
The standard error of the mean is equal to (XS) divided by the square
root of N. Thus, the test statistic ta is given by
t =
ao C a(XS)
where t has a students t distribution with N - 1 degrees of freedom.
37. For a perfectly diversified fund with beta - S and alpha equal to
P
zero, the plan 1 t statistic has an expected value equal to
E(t) ( - 1) E(r,4 rf)vhi[(5 - 1) (rM - rf)]/[( 1)22 ]r 1/2ip 1 ( M - rf)
where E(rM - rf) is the expected month market risk premium, and a (rM - rf)
is the variance of the market risk premium. See column (2) of table
2-1 for estimated denominator values as a function of fund beta. The
average market risk premium during the 12 years (rM - rf) was 0.71
percent per month.
38. The expression for t in footnote 34 must now be modified to allow for
imperfect fund diversification. This simply requires addition of the
term a 2(p ) inside the square root sign in the denominator. Estimated
values for the denominator are now given in column (4) of table 2.1.
Note the bias reduction will be the largest for the high beta funds since
the residual variations for these funds is greater than for the low
beta funds.
39. One of the better documented propositions in the field of finance is
Footnotes 8
that over long run periods, higher risk stocks tend to have higher
rates of return, on average (see, for example, Black Jensen & Scholes
[ ], Fama and MacBeth [ ], Modigliani and Pogue [ ], section
7, pp. 35-45). This fact is sufficient to establish the various
plan 1 beta biases.
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